A STUDY ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA, 1966-1999
ABSTRACT
Contemporary civil-military relations is mainly concerned with the civilian leadership’s control
of the military in a democracy. As such, this study assessed the factors that shaped the
relationship between the civilian leadership and the military establishment in Nigeria (1999-
2007).This is because Nigeria’s path of political development and by extension its civil-military
relations differs from what obtains in countries with well-established democratic traditions. The
study adopted and modified Peter Feaver’s Agency theory of civil-military relations. The study
assumed that the nature of the interactions between the civilian and military leaderships, the role
of the civil society and the international environment were prominent in shaping Nigeria’s civilmilitary relations since the inception of the elected civilian government in May 1999. The factors
identified include the expertise of the civilian leadership and the willingness of the military to
accept directives from the civilian leadership, the constitutional and policy frameworks under
which these civilian and military leaderships operated and the roles of civil society and international actors notably the advanced democracies. Employing the qualitative content analysis method in the collection and assessment of data, findings showed the following: the
civilian leadership’s knowledge of military matters enhanced the capacity to control the Nigerian
military; the role of the civil society as advocate of liberal democratic civil-military relations was
very limited; the military’s acceptance to obey constituted authority was a determining factor in
civilian control capacity and the role of the international community in terms of its expectations
and aid in the area of security sector reform gave an impetus to the capacity for civilian control
of the military
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
TITLE PAGE
DECLARATION————————————————————————————- i
CERTIFICATION———————————————————————————– ii
DEDICATION—————————————————————————————- iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS———————————————————————— iv
ABSTRACT——————————————————————————————- v
CHAPTER ONE:
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1-Background to the Study————————————————————————–1
1.2-Statement of Research Problem——————————————————————4
1.3-Research Questions——————————————————————————–5
1.4-The Aim and Objectives of the Study———————————————————–6
1.5-Assumptions of the Study————————————————————————-6
1.6-Significance of the Study————————————————————————-8
1.7-Scope and Limitations—————————————————————————-9
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1- Introduction—————————————————————————————–11
2.1.1-The Classical Liberal Assumption in Civil-Military Relations—————————–12
2.1.2-The Phenomena of Military Professionalism and Intervention—————————–14
2.1.3-Typologies of Civil-Military Relations——————————————————–20
2.1.4-Causes of Military Coups————————————————————————26
2.1.5- The Legitimacy Question of Military Rule—————————————————34
2.1.6-Military Withdrawal to the Barracks ———————————————————–38
2.1.7-Guarding the Guardian of the State: Civil Control of the Military————————-52
2.1.8- Contemporary Theories of ‘Democratic’ Civil Military Relations ———————–63
2.1.9-Summary of the Literature———————————————————————–75
2.2-Theoretical Framework—————————————————————————76
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
3.1-Introduction——————————————————————————————–84
3.2-Population in the Study——————————————————————————-85
3.3-Method of Data Collection—————————————————————————87
3.4-Style of Data Presentation and Analysis————————————————————90
CHAPTER FOUR
AN OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FROM THE COLONISATION
PERIOD TO A POST-INDEPENDENT NIGERIA, 1863 to 1998
4.1-Introduction——————————————————————————————–92
4.2- Colonial Origins and Evolution of the Military————————————————–92
4.3-The Phenomenon of Military Coups in Nigeria, 1966-1998————————————96
4.4-The Military in the First Republic, 1960-1966—————————————————98
4.5-The First Military Tenure of Factionalism and Cycle of Coups: 1966-1979—————–106
4.6-The Second Civilian Tenure: October 1 1979 to December 31 1983————————–131
4.7-The Second Military Tenure of Factionalism and Cycle of Coups: 1984-1998————–136
4.8-Summary of Chapter———————————————————————————-156
CHAPTER FIVE
POLITICAL TRANSITIONS TO CIVIL RULE IN NIGERIA
5.1-Introduction——————————————————————————————–160
5.2-Typologies of Political Transitions in Nigeria—————————————————-160
5.3-The Colonial Transition to Independence———————————————————164
5.4-Transition under the First Era of Military Rule—————————————————166
5.5-Transitions under the Second Era of Military Rule———————————————-170
5.6-The Driving Factors behind the 1998/1999 Transition to Civil Rule————————–175
5.7-The Significance of General Abubakar’s Transition: August 1998 to May 1999————183
5.8-Summary of Chapter———————————————————————————-192
CHAPTER SIX
AN ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC
NIGERIA, 1999-2007
6.1-Introduction——————————————————————————————195
6.2-The Constitutional and Policy Frameworks of Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations———195
6.2.1-Constitutional Framework of Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations————————–196
6.2.2-Policy Orientation and Direction in Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations——————201
6.3-The Nature of Civilian Leadership; Experience and Expertise——————————-218
6.4-The Nature of Military Leadership: Professionalism and Obedience————————227
6.5-The International Dimension in Nigeria’s Civil-Military Relations————————-237
6.6-Findings and Analysis of Study——————————————————————-254
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
7.1-Introduction—————————————————————————————-257
7.2-Summary of the Study—————————————————————————-257
7.3-Conclusions—————————————————————————————-259
REFERENCE————————————————————————————262
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1-Background to the Study
The basis for military coups and rulership in many countries gradually eroded as a result of exerted pressure for political pluralism in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The intensification of the processes of globalisation, a multi-dimensional capitalist phenomenon, led to the triumph of the forces of capital over the restrictive forces of the state. As such, the economic implications for political stability in such regions of the globe inevitably led to pressures for political reforms. Military regimes, like the civilian-led autocratic regimes, became increasingly on the retreat due to agitations from within and the international community. These pressures coincided with the end of the Cold War, as witnessed by the triumph of the Western Capitalist powers over the Soviet-led Socialist hegemony in Europe. In short, the pressures for democratic change in many enclaves were largely conditioned “by the swift currents of globalisation and Western triumphalism” (Jega, 2007: 19). As the forces of liberal democracy intensified in their spread, political disengagement began to occur and reached a climax in Africa in the 1990s across most of those states that experienced military intervention and rule. The soldiers began disengaging or withdrawing to the barracks as political power reverted back to the civilian elites. The general outlook of the post-transition period witnessed a reduction in the levels of successful military coups across Africa. The military was conditioned to accept civilian democratic rule and withdraw to the barracks. The nature of civil-military relations (CMRs) changed as the military establishment was subordinated to the supremacy of a civilian authority. This has been more evident in Africa since the end of the 20th century. The concept of civil-military relations connotes a dynamic interaction between military
and the many civil sectors of the state as defined by a boundary. This boundary defines where
military power begins and ends in terms of statutory functions, roles and activities. This
boundary could be defined by an established tradition or explicit constitutional provisions of a
country. Examples are the 1979 and 1999 presidential constitutions of post-independent Nigeria
where the role and power of the armed forces is stated in relation to the supremacy of the
civilian authorities (FRN, 1979 Constitution, Section 197[1-2]: 64, FRN, 1999 Constitution,
Section 217[1-2]: 85). In general, this change in the balance of power between the military and
civil institutions in emerging democracies has led to changes in the nature of civil-military
relations because the military surrenders control of political power. The fundamental role of the
military is carried out under civilian directives. In some states like Algeria, Equatorial Guinea and
Uganda, soldiers in power carefully devised exit plans by installing civilianised leaderships having
strong and often, cordial ties to the military establishment.
Generally, the role of the military in a democratic dispensation depends on the level of
political culture or the general orientation of the people towards the political system
(Huntington, 1964, Finer, 1975). Where the political culture is high and the civilian leaders have
legitimate right to rule, the military is forced to accept civilian control. At this level, the mature
or developed political culture allows the military to employ subtle methods like normal
constitutional channels and resorts to collusion with the civilian authorities. When it is low, the
legitimacy of civil rule is eroded and thus weak civilian control ensues. The likely outcome is for
the military to displace or even supplant the weak civilian leadership by resorting to threats to
withdraw support or direct coercion against the civilian government (Finer, 1975: 126-127).
Nigeria has witnessed eleven successful and unsuccessful military coups. Most were against
fellow military leaders with three of such leaders losing their lives while in office- Aguiyi Ironsi in
July 1966, Murtala Mohammed in February 1976 and Sani Abacha in June 1998. The marathon
of successful and aborted coups against civilian and military governments resulted in prolonged
military rule in the country. At certain periods, the military have expressed the imperative for
disengagement because of the belief that it is an aberration to have soldiers in mainstream
politics. As such, the coupists (turned rulers) ‘have been quick to declare their readiness to
hand-over political power to an elected civilian regime’ (Onuoha, 2002: 19).
The last military regime (1998-1999) organized a short transition programme that culminated
in the emergence of an elected civilian government under Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired general
and one-time military head of state. The process also witnessed the participation of many
retired military officers who had occupied offices in the previous military regimes. The
administration completed its two terms of four years each and handed over to another civilian
government in May 2007. This is the longest life-span that a civilian regime has achieved so far
since 1960. In the past, segments of the fractured civilian elite, retired and serving military
officers conspired in December 1983 to overthrow a civilian government in Nigeria (Othman,
1984). In the democratic era, a new form of civil-military relations has emerged. The military has
remained in the barracks and a civilian-led dispensation endures within a more or less
democratic framework.
1.2-Statement of the Research Problem
In contemporary civil-military relations in a democracy, the primary focus of analysis is based
on two crucial issues. The first issue has to do with who controls the military and the second has
to do with how such control is made possible. In a liberal-democracy, the elected civilian
leadership is expected to exercise control on the military. However, the arena of civil-military
relations in an emerging democracy differs from that of a well-established democracy. The
processes that exist for civilian control of the military may neither conform to what obtains in
the advanced democracies nor be uniform for all emerging democratic states. This has to do
with differences in historical experience, the legitimacy of civilian sectors of the state, the role of
the military hierarchy and the role of foreign interests in supporting or subverting the
emergence of democratic civil-military relations. Generally, an emerging democracy with fragile
political institutions faces challenges relating to systemic stability and continuity, especially if it
has experienced incessant military coups and prolonged military rule. This does not only pose
challenges to the democratisation process but also to the nature of civil-military relations.
An understanding of civil-military relations in Nigeria an emerging liberal-democracy is
important to note within the context of three considerations. First, such an emerging democracy
has in the past witnessed periods of military rule as a result of coups and possible civilian rule
before embarking on a process of enthroning democratic governance. As such, it has tendencies
of having weak civil sectors of the state and a class of retired military officials who may have
strong influence in the political landscape of the country. Second, the emerging civilian
institutions that are directly responsible for control of the military establishment are often
fragile due to relative institutionalisation of democratic culture. Thus, the government has to
devise ways by which to impose its authority on the military establishment. Third, the transition
it embarked upon does not take place in isolation. The transition to democratic governance
cannot be understood devoid of the globalising currents of liberalisation of the democratic
space. Thus, the direct or indirect role of foreign forces as an external variable in pushing for
political changes within a transiting country is very important.
This work is anchored on examining the factors responsible for shaping how civilian control of
the military takes place in post-transition Nigeria, as an emerging democracy (1999-2007)
grappling with relatively weak, dysfunctional civil political institutions and intractable social
contradictions that shaped military coups and prolonged rule.
1.3- Research Questions
i)-What is the nature of civil-military relations in Nigeria in the periods before and after the
1998 transition to a democratic dispensation?
ii)-What measures did the civilian leadership adopt to ensure effective control of the military?
iii)- What is the level of subordination of the military leadership to civil authority?
iv)-What is the role of social movements notably Civil Society Organisations during and after the
transition to democratic rule as it relates to ensuring the supremacy of civilian leaders in their
control of the military?
v)-What was the role of foreign actors in shaping civil-military relations more or less in line with
liberal-democratic ethos?
1.4-Aim and Objectives of the Study
The aim of this work is to identify, examine and evaluate those factors and/or forces that
shaped the nature of civilian control of the military in Nigeria as an emerging liberal democracy.
In doing this, the work pursued the following objectives:
i)-To examine the historical antecedents of civil-military relations under past civilian and
military dispensations before 1999 and how it has shaped the nature of civil-military
relations between 1999 and 2007;
ii)-To assess the nature and role of the civilian leadership in crafting and exercising
control of the military between 1999 and 2007;
iii)-To assess the nature and role of the military in the context of the military
leadership’s acceptance of the supremacy of civilian authority;
iv)-To examine the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in shaping civil-military
relations in Nigeria’s post-military regime; and
v)-To examine and assess the contribution of the international community especially the
Western powers in assisting the Nigerian civilian leadership’s effort to exercise control
of the military.
1.5-Assumptions of the Study
Generally, the study proposed that certain factors are responsible for shaping the relationship
between civilian leadership and the military establishment in Nigeria’s emergent democratic
dispensation (1999-2007). These factors are located in Nigeria’s domestic and external
environments and within the military establishment itself. As such, civil-military relations are
shaped by the civilian leadership, the military, civil society and the international community.
Thus, the study came up with four assumptions.
i) -The first assumption (A1) states that knowledge in military related matters by the
relevant civil authority enhances the ability to control the military in Nigeria.
ii) -The second assumption (A2) states that acceptance by the Nigerian military leadership
of the principle of civil supremacy has enhanced the capacity for civilian control of
the military.
iii) -The third assumption (A3) states that domestic advocacy by social movements notably
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) has enhanced the civilian government’s effort to
control the Nigerian military
iv) -The fourth assumption (A4) states that International support for the promotion of
liberal democracy in Nigeria has enhanced the civilian government’s capacity to
establish control of the military
The first assumption is based on the knowledge of some individuals who occupy strategic
positions in the civilian government in effectively dealing with the military as an institution.
Their expertise in military matters reinforces existing policy and constitutional frameworks and
thus, contributes in controlling the behaviour of the military institution towards the political
system of the emerging democracy. The second assumption has to do with the internal
orientation of the military particularly, the transitional and post-transition leadership within the
officer corps. This is with respect to their personal and institutional perception of democracy
and their loyalty to civil authorities. The third has to do with the role of civil society groups. It is
important in the advocacy for civilian oversight of military activities. The last is the role of the
external environment notably the advanced democratic states in shaping civil-military relations
by promoting policies such as training and administrative reform which strengthen the civilian
leadership in its effort to exercise effective control of the military.
1.6-Significance of the Study
This study of civil-military relations in Nigeria as an emerging democracy is important because
of a number of reasons. There is need to understand the factors and forces that determine how
civilian governments exercise control of their militaries. First, studies on civil military relations in
a country generally focus on who controls the military. However, it neglects the factors that
determine how such control is exercised especially for states that have recently instituted
liberal-democratic rule. Second, the post-Cold War winds of liberal democracy have largely
swept away the vestiges of military rule around the world and this has led to changes in the civilmilitary relations of such emerging democracies. A major emphasis of the literature on civilmilitary relations of non-democratic or politically fragile states is based on developments within
the Cold War period. The classical works by Huntington, Finer and Janowitz suffer the deficit of
understanding the recent domestic and global developments that have invariably shaped civilmilitary relations in states transiting from military to civilian rule. These factors cover the
institutional, orientational and systemic facets of such a dynamic and complex relationship.
Third, in places where the military has played central role in mainstream politics, understanding
the orientation of the military towards the new political arrangement is a justification for studies
into the power relations existing in such country. It can even discern why a particular political
order exists and endures while other dispensations have not. Fourth, the domestic and external
factors are important in contemporary studies of civil-military relations especially for a country
that transforms from a military regime to a civilian democracy. Thus, the nature of the elected
civilian government, the role of civil society and the influence of the international environment
are important in order to assess how they combine to shape the character of civil-military
relations. Lastly, this study can serve as a reservoir of ideas for both decision-makers and
scholars of political discourse. Such a study can be of use in making inputs for long-term policy
options on how civilian leaders can effectively handle the military to ensure its subordination to
democratic institutions. In the same vein, students of civil-military relations can draw important
lessons from political history of erstwhile unstable states to build both descriptive and
prescriptive theories for society as a whole to benefit from.
1.7-Scope and Limitations of the Study
The field of civil-military relations is vast and multi-dimensional in scope and content. As such,
the scope of this research covered the intellectual, political, strategic and legal dimensions of
civil-military relations in Nigeria as an emerging democracy. The intellectual dimension connotes
the corpus of civil-military thought in terms of who control the military. The political dimension
dwells on the phenomena of civilian control, praetorianism and the relative degree of military
influence on mainstream politics. The strategic dimension covers the military assistance to
civilian authority and the legal dimension implies subjecting the military to civil and military
laws. In explicit terms it focused on a qualitative assessment of how the historical, political,
societal, military and external factors have shaped civilian control of the military in Nigeria
between 1999 and 2007.
In terms of limitations, the study faced a number of obstacles in the search for data. First,
there was the fear of either acquiring false data or ending up with no data at all. In less
developed countries where the political system is less open to the inner workings of
government, some level of ideological prejudice exists within state institutions when it comes to
providing accessibility to relevant information especially if such data are closely related to the
defence and security of the state. Secondly, the study also observed the culture of poor record
keeping especially in the library and archives of the National Assembly. It was observed that
virtually all the relevant documents as in gazettes or proceedings of committee sittings were not
found despite repeated visits. Related to this is the volume of data sought for the study from
designated respondents. Some respondents were unwilling to provide specific details on
questions asked in an attempt not to divulge what they saw as sensitive information. Others did
not accept the request for an interview. Lastly, the study took a longer period to conclude as a
result of repeated visits to meet respondents for designated interviews which formed an
important segment of the primary data.
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