A STUDY OF MILITARY RULE IN NIGERIA: A CASE APPRAISAL OF IBRAHIM BABANGIDA MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
ABSTRACT.
On August 27, 1985, Major-General Ibrahim Babangida carried-out a coup d’etat against the then military ruler of Nigeria, General Muhammadu Buhari. The main reason for the putsch was the believe that the Buhari regime had no plan to return Nigeria to civilian rule. Apart from this, the country was beset with various nation-building challenges that the junta had no clear-cut answers to. Such challenges include that of corruption, ethnicity, governance and religion. Babangida carried-out his coup ostensibly to return the country to civilian rule, tackle these nation-building challenges and turn Nigeria into a cohesive, functional and viable polity. To achieve these important aims and objectives, Babangida established a transition programme to return Nigeria to civilian rule and used institutional, praetorian and constitutional mechanisms to tackle the country’s nationhood challenges. This work is an analysis of the programmes, measures and initiatives that the Babangida regime used to tackle Nigeria’s nation-building challenges and prepare the country for eventual return to civilian rule. Introduction By the beginning of 1980, it was clear that the civilian rule of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the Second Republic could not handle the multi-faceted challenges that confronted the Nigerian state. The major ones are those of corruption, governance and mono-commodity. Of particular importance were the issues of corruption and political instability in the Second Republic. The General Muhammadu Buhari regime that toppled the Shagari administration in 1983 advanced the two as the basic reasons. The junta was initially welcomed by the people but because of its high-handedness and draconian decrees, it soon alienated the citizenry. By 1985, it was obvious to the political elites in the country that the Buhari regime had no plan to relinquish political power back to the people in the foreseeable future. The unpopularity of the Buhari regime that was caused by the aloofness and the draconian style of leadership forced the junta to rely on brute force and military diktat to govern Nigeria. The people and the political elites were excluded from the political administration the country. Feeling that the country was tottering at the edge of a precipice, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida carried out a putsch against Buhari on the 27th August, 1985. After the success of his coup against Buhari in 1985, Babangida began a political and socio-economic process that he claimed would rescue Nigeria from the vicious of instability that has plagued the country since independence in 1960. Babangida signaled his desire to return the country to democratic rule by establishing a transition to civilian rule program. In restrospect, this was meant to be the administration signature achievement but for the shenanigans of Babangida himself that truncated what would have etched his name in posterity. Babangida’s military administration was like no other in Nigeria’s political history. The administration took some radical steps and established some programs whose impacts lasted till the dawn of the Fourth Republic in 1999 and beyond. Apart from the fact that the administration regulated and regimented the pace of socio-political and economic development in the country, Babangida also fundamentally altered the face of the country’s geographical terrain. This work is an analysis of the military administration of the General Ibrahim Babangida regime in Nigeria between 1985 and 1993. The emphasis of the work is on the different initiatives and programs the administration used in trying to turn the country into a viable, workable and stable entity.
THEORETICAL RATIONALE:
Good Governance Theory Good Governance Theory (GGT) is the framework that undergirds this work. The theory highlights some basic ideas that a good government, no matter its type, must abide by. Some of these principles are those of accountability, transparency, efficiency, meritocracy, participation and responsiveness [1]. GGT simply states that a workable state can only be created if it has efficient public service, an independent judiciary, a legal framework to enforce contracts and a responsible administration of public funds [2]. Going by the assertion of the World Bank, good governance is predicated on three things in the society: the type of political system (military, totalitarian, dictatorship, communism), the line of authority in the management of social and economic resources and the capability of government to formulate and implement policies [3]. Other essential elements of the GGT are political participation, rule of law, consensus, equity, inclusiveness and effectiveness. The idea here is that the quality of governance can be enhanced by the judicious adoption of this theory. GGT is aimed at achieving efficiency in public service delivery, encouraging competition, privatization, civil service reforms and decentralization [4]. The theory is associated with governing methods and structures in developing countries. The GGT is particularly relevant to Nigeria. Though, not explicitly stated by the Babangida administration, one can say that what it strived to achieve in Nigeria can be conveniently located and interpreted in the GGT. When Babangida became the head of state in 1985, Nigeria was faced with serious nation-building challenges such as that of governance, corruption, transparency and democracy. In order to get Nigeria out of the political morass that it seemed to be perpetually stuck in, Babangida decided to make governance to be more opened and attuned to the people. What one notices at the beginning of his administration was the desire to create an inclusive political system, based on meritocracy, that is open to every citizen within the country. The administration also strived to entrench such concepts as accountability, transparecncy, responsibility, privatization and an effective and efficient bureaucracy within the Nigerian political and social space. All these are in line with the principles and tenets of the GGT. Had the administration steadfastly adhered to the key principle of implementation of governmental policies, which is tied to the idea of political will, Nigeria would have emerged a better and stronger political entity post-Babangida regime.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
The authors have discovered in the course of the research that the different rulers in Nigeria made use of conceptual, praetorian, institutional and constitutional mechanisms in the country’s nation-building process. The use of these mechanisms, sometimes individually or in combination, was noticeable in the country’s nation-building process. These mechanisms were used by the state to achieve the principle objectives of the GGT. Institutional mechanism is the creation and use of specific organizations to tackle particular nation-building challenges. For instance, Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration made use of the institutional mechanism to tackle specific challenges of nation-building between 1999 and 2007. This was the rationale behind the formation of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003. It was an institutional response meant to tackle the challenge of corruption [5]. General Yakubu Gowon’s establishment of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in 1973 was another institutional program meant to help the nation-building process in Nigeria. Other administrations adopted the constitutional mechanism to overcome some aspects of Nigeria’s nation-building challenges. Constitutional mechanism is the use of specific provisions in the Nigerian Constitution to address specific nation-building challenges. When there are no such provisions that can tackle specific challenges, the mechanism allow for the use of amendments to the constitution to make it relevant to the particular challenge. This, for example, was the rationale behind the insertion of the federal character principle and principle of fiscal federalism into the 1979 Nigerian Constitution by General Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime in 1979 [6]. This insertion was done, it must be noted, to ensure that all the ethnic groups are represented at the centre and to also ensure the equitable distribution of federal resources.
Praetorian mechanism was the favoured tool of the different military administrations that ruled Nigeria from 1967 to 1999. This tool involved the use of decrees and edicts to tackle Nigeria’s nation-building challenges. For example, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi used decrees 33 and 34 of 1966 to turn Nigeria into a unitary state [7]. This was done to tackle the problem of unity in the country’s nation-building process. General Yakubu Gowon used the Enterprise Promotion decree No. 4 of 1972 to tackle the challenge of economic insufficiency. And, General Ibrahim Babangida used decree to establish Mass Mobilization for Self Reliance, Economic Recovery and Social Justice (MAMSER) in 1987 [8]. MAMSER was designed to make Nigeria socio- economically and politically viable. Conceptual mechanism the use of targeted ideas, precept, norms, intellection and principles in Nigeria’s democratization process. Such concepts include transparency, governance, accountability and rule of law. It is the preference of civil society groups (CSGs) in resolving Nigeria’s nation building challenges. In contrast to the vertical approach adopted by the state in Nigeria, CSGs adopted the horizontal approach to tackle Nigeria’s nation-building challenges during the period. This approach fostered interactions and the exchange and dissemination of ideas across the socio-cultural and political spectrum of Nigeria. However, some of the military and civilian rulers also made use the mechanism to tackle specific nation-building challenges that confronted them. The Babangida Regime: An Overview On August 27, 1985, Buhari was overthrown in a palace coup staged by Major General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. The new military regime cited several factors as justification for the coup. These includes Buhari’s inability to bring the economy under control; his dictatorial tendencies that had resulted in a poor human rights record; his failure to establish a transition to civilian rule program; and his refusal to involve his colleagues in the decision-making process of his regime [9]. In order to generate credibility for the new regime, Babangida took a more conciliatory approach to governance than had Buhari [10]. Babangida opened investigations into human rights abuses perpetrated by the Buhari regime and overturned the jail sentences of many of those convicted under his predecessor’s regime. Babangida repealed most of the draconian decrees, especially those that Buhari used in gaggling the press between 1983 and 1985. Babangida encouraged public debate on issues pertaining to the governance of Nigeria. In addition, Babangida took the title ‘president’, a first by any military ruler, rather than use the traditional title ‘head of state’. This was done to indicate that he served as chief executive in the new dispensation and to provide the needed democratic legitimation for his tenure [11]. Babangida restructured and reconstituted key organs of government. These included the change in the names of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) to Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and that of the chief of staff to Chief of General Staff (CGS) [12]. He further expanded the federal character principle in the composition of key organs of government. This last act was done to redress the North-South imbalance created by the Buhari regime. Through this act, Babangida ensured that none of the three major ethno-linguistic groups in the country could claim any kind of dominance in the makeup of the AFRC. The Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) was one of the new structures created by the regime to serve as its think-tank. The PAC, established in 1985, consisted mainly of academics who were responsible for formulating and monitoring most of the economic and political policies of the regime [13]. To consolidate its populism, the regime, at the initial stage, adopted a participatory and public-responsive approach to decision-making on crucial issues of national significance [14]. For example, this was the approach Babangida adopted over the IMF/World Bank SAP issue that confronted the regime in 1985. Instead of unilaterally taking the IMF loan, which would have ushered in IMF-inspired SAP for the country, Babangida threw it open and made it into a ‘plebiscite’ [15]. Nigerians voted against the IMF loan and this made Babangida to evolve a ‘home-grown’ version of SAP in October 1985 to tackle Nigeria’s challenge of aurtarky. From early 1986, after the initial period of relaxation and debate, the Babangida’s regime came under sustained pressure from groups that were opposed to its programs of political and economic reforms. The firm resistance the regime encountered brought out its authoritarian and dictatorial tendency. The main opposition to the regime’s authority was spearheaded by the NLC, students and
university teachers. It has been argued that it was the repressive imperative of SAP implementation that was responsible for the authoritarian posture the regime adopted from the late 1980s [16]. Between 1985 and 1990, the regime uncovered and averted two coups attempt. The first was carried out in December 1985 by General Mamman Vatsa, minister for the Federal Capital Territory with several other officers and men. The plotters were said to be dissatisfied with some of the regime’s economic policies and its liberal human rights posture, among other things. Vasta and some of his co-conspirators were executed on March 5, 1986 after being convicted by a military tribunal. The second coup attempt was carried-out in April 1990. This was also put down by the Babangida regime. By 1987, due to the increasing unrest and riots, the regime turned on the NLC, students, ASUU and the Nigerian Press. It was during this period that Dele Giwa, the editor of Newswatch, was killed. Major newspapers in Nigeria, such as The Guardian, Punch, Vanguard and Concord also experienced closure during this period. Religious riots, conflicts and tensions were also rife during Babangida’s regime. The challenge of religion became an important problem for the regime when the issues of membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and that of Sharia brought Nigeria to the brink of a major religious war. In 1986, without consultation or debate with even members of his AFRC, not to talk of the citizens, Babangida made Nigeria a member of the OIC. The move sparked widespread condemnation in the southern part of the country. Christian leaders from the region protested and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Nigeria from the OLC. They based their objections on the fact that Nigeria was a secular state and as such, it has no business being a full member of a religious organization. The Supreme Council For Islamic Affairs (SCIA) in Nigeria was adamant and insisted on Nigeria’s continued membership of the OIC. Babangida had to eventually set up a committee, under Colonel John Shagaya, to try and resolve the controversy. The centerpiece of Babangida’s regime was the transition to civilian rule program. From the inception of his regime in 1985, Babangida had announced that the creation of a viable transition program was a major goal. This assertion conferred an important modicum of political capital on his regime among the Nigerian public and CSGs. Indeed, all other policies of the regime such as administrative reforms, mass mobilization, economic policies and grassroots development were all meant to be an integral parts of the transition process. The transition programs of the regime were designed to ensure the birth of the Third Republic on the one hand; and to create a viable, cohesive, functional and democratic Nigeria, at the other extreme. Babangida established a body, the Political Bureau, which among other things, drew up a comprehensive timetable for a transition to civilian rule program [17]. The Political Bureau submitted its report in March 1987, and among other recommendations, stated that the transition period will extend from 1990 to 1992. But this date was later pushed back to January 2, 1993 and finally to August 27, 1993 [18]. This vacillations was noticeable throughout the different phases of the transition process. Babangida consistently manipulated the transition process by moving timelines, amending procedures and frequently banning and unbanning politicians and government officials during the transition process. He justified his frequent interference on the exigencies of the political process in Nigeria. That is, to create a semblance of stability and continuity in the face of corruption and other socio-economic ills. However, the real reasons for his vacillations became clear towards the end of his regime in 1993. Babangida never planned to give legitimate authority back to the civilians. He was interested in transmuting into a civilian president, or at the least, extends the military’s hold on power. The chicanery of such organization as the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN), which was a front for the regime, gave credence to this assertion. It should be pointed out that Babangida’s transition program had social and economic dimensions. Some programs were established to address the social welfare and life chances of the majority of the citizens. These included the Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructural (DFRRI), National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and Peoples Bank. The economics aspect fell under the IMF and World Bank-sponsored SAP. An important stage in the transition process was the formation and registration of political parties. The regime, through the National Electoral Commission (NEC) it established, set stringent guidelines for political parties that wished to participate in the Third Republic. As part of the conditionalities, political parties were expected to
present the passport photographs of all registered members. Political parties were further expected to establish in all the capitals of states in the federation well-manned and functioning offices. Thirteen political associations applied for recognition. ANPP, Ideal People’s Party (IPP), Liberal Convention (LC), National Unity Party (NUP), Nigeria Labour Party (NLP), Nigerian National Congress (NNC), Nigerian People’s Welfare Party (NPWP), Patriotic Nigerian Party (PNP), People’s Front of Nigeria (PFN), People’s Patriotic Party (PPP), People’s Solidarity Party (PSP), Republication Party of Nigeria (RPN) and United Nigeria Democratic (UNDP). The thirteen political associations were eventually whittled down to six by NEC. However, none of the six associations was approved for registration as political parties by the AFRC. The AFRC accused the political associations, among other things, of being formed along ethno-regional and religious lines and that some of them were reincarnations of the political parties of the First and Second Republics. The AFRC then went ahead to establish two grassroots political parties in 1989, the SDP and NRC. These were two state-sponsored political parties that the regime recognized as being legitimately responsible for carrying-out political activities in the Third Republic. Thus, rather than use the transition program to put in place structures that would promote an enduring democracy in the Third Republic, the transition became a tool for promoting Babangida’s personal rule. Babangida was actively aided by NEC in this endeavour. The NEC, with Babangida’s approval, constantly tinkered with the electoral rules and elections timetable to make it impossible for the recognized political parties to function optimally. In 1991, Babangida created nine new states bringing the total number of states to thirty. These new states participated in the elections to states assemblies, governorships, and the national assembly that took place in 1992. After repeatedly shifting the dates for the presidential elections, the regime in early 1993 cleared two candidates to run in the presidential elections. Chief M.K.O Abiola was cleared and nominated as the SDP presidential candidate; while Bashir Tofa was nominated for the NRC. The presidential elections finally took place on June 12, 1993. Chief Abiola, the SDP candidate, won the presidential election. Faced with the prospect of finally having to relinquish power, Babangida annulled the election result on June 23. The resulting violence from the annulment, and the general climate of anarchy and insecurity this created, forced Babangida to hurriedly step aside. He handed power over to Chief Ernest Shonekan on August 27, 1993. Shonekan then became the head of the Interim National Government (ING) that ruled Nigeria until he was removed by General Sani Abacha. Having provided the background and a snapshot of the Babangida regime between 1985 and 1993, the subsequent parts of the paper will be devoted to the analysis of the different mechanisms the administration used in trying to achieve the basic principles in the GGT for the Nigerian state.
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