AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLICATION ON THE NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA, 2009-2017
Abstract
This study attempts to draw attention to the Boko Haram insurgency and its implications for national security in Nigeria. Using a historical method of research and content analysis, it adopts a descriptive and exploratory approach. It shows how the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in a dire humanitarian situation evident from the human casualties, human rights abuses, population displacement and refugee debacle, livelihood crisis, and public insecurity – which portend negatively for the maintenance of national security in Nigeria. The study discusses how the counter-terrorism in northeast Nigeria appears to have caused more harm than good and how the terrorist conflict is far from reaching a stalemate ripe for resolution. It is recommended that the Nigerian government should refocus its efforts on a people-centric, community-based and intelligence-driven, whole-of-government approach to better police its borders, improve the capacity of the security forces, enhance interagency cooperation and improve cooperation in the sub-region. The Government should empower the local communities to reach out to the perpetrators of the insurgency with a message of peace and reconciliation. A shift to a restorative and community justice approach may be a pointer to a lasting solution.
Introduction
Nigeria is confronted with daunting challenges to its political stability occasioned by insurgence and terrorism1 (Obafemi and Galadima 2013a:xv). Over the past decades, different forms of domestic and international terrorism have been witnessed around the world (Egbue, Nwankwo and Alichie 2015:14). Nigeria too, is caught in the frenzy of terrorism to a degree and intensity never experienced before. Terrorism is posing a great threat, not just to life, property, human rights, dignity and democratic values, but to the very fabric and existence of Nigeria (Obafemi and Galadima 2013a:xv; Mbombo 2015:84). Whether internationalised or localised, it is mostly politically motivated, but it may also show auxiliary motives of a religious, economic or social kind (Chukwurah, Eme and Ogbeje 2015:371).
The Boko Haram sect started with sporadic attacks on security formations. With time, they graduated to offensives on Christian churches, Mosques, schools and other public places. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombing has since added to the ever degenerating complexion of insurgency. According to the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation, the group has carried out 1 639 violent attacks with 14 436 fatalities, 6 051 injured victims, and 2 063 hostages across the northeast region of Nigeria (Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation 2018). So far, no lasting remedy is in sight as the faceless leadership of the sect has remained rather intransigent and malignant (Okoli and Iortyer 2014:44).
Their modus operandi is very amorphous and their tactical focus evidently unpredictable (Achodo 2019:4).
If the strategic objective of the government is to militarily degrade and defeat this group, both in the short and the long term, that will require a distinctive set of rules of engagement. Conversely, if the strategic objective of the government is to politically negotiate cessation of violence and resolution to the crisis, then a different military concept of operations and rules of engagement would be required both in the short and long term (Achodo 2019:3). The current military operations offer no credible indications of purpose and objective other than to defeat the insurgency. This poses a huge dilemma for the army, as the war is mostly internal and executed by local national actors within the region and with varied external support (Achodo 2019:3).
Before the violent conflict finally becomes history, the need to build a bridge between potential terrorists and survivors that would preclude future atrocities should be recognised, and first moves should be undertaken – just as building a literal bridge begins with the construction of solid bases on the riverbanks (Mbombo 2015:85). The Boko Haram sect and the community of survivors in northeast Nigeria should be regarded as primary stakeholders and partners in a joint problem-solving process. In fighting domestic terrorism, the bleeding party is not the government, but the local community. Deradicalisation in this regard must come from the victims rather than the government as party to the conflict. What matters most if future occurrences of violence are to be avoided, is not the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure (as schools, housing and bridges), but the reconciliation between victims and perpetrators (Mbombo 2015:86). The need for restorative and community justice cannot be overlooked.
Background information
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in world history. It has existed in every age, and important terrorist groups as the following may serve as prominent examples: the Baader Mainhof gang of West Germany, the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigade, the Palestinian al-Fatah, the Israeli Haganah, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Osama Ibn Laden’s Al-Qaeda, the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, the Somalian al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) (Livingstone, Bruce and Wanek 1978:3; Ngare 2012, cited in Okoli and Iortyer 2014:42) and the Islamic State group (IS) in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and elsewhere (for instance, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria). The Nigerian Boko Haram has recently (2013) been listed by the United States among the league of the world’s terrorist groups (Okoli and Iortyer 2014:42).
Terrorism, arguably, is one of the most serious threats to global peace and stability in contemporary times. Since the dawn of this millennium, the incidence of terrorism has been on a steady rise worldwide. Hitherto, however, terrorism was more or less a national or regional affair (Okoli and Iortyer 2014:39). Some years ago, terrorism still seemed to be restricted to a few isolated places, such as Northern Ireland, the Basque Country in northern Spain, and some areas of the Middle East. Now – especially since 11 September 2001, with the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York – it has mushroomed into a worldwide phenomenon (June 2006:4).
Okoli and Iortyer (2014:42) point out that since Nigeria broke from the shackles of British colonial rule in 1960, she has increasingly found it difficult to surmount her basic security challenges. Security and stability appear to have been the major challenges in the nation’s chequered political history. Okoli and Iortyer (2014, citing Fwatshak and Ayuba 2007:255–272) further argue that since independence, not a single decade has passed without at least one major cataclysmic crisis in Nigeria. Nigeria experienced the Western region political crises in the 1960s, incessant military coups, and a fratricidal civil war between 1967 and 1970. The last three to four decades also witnessed some of the worst civil and sectarian crises. Cases in point include the Maitatsine riots, starting in Kano and spreading to most parts of northern Nigeria in the 1980s, the ethno-religious crises in Kafanchan and Zango Kataf in Southern Kaduna in 1987 and 1992, the intractable ethno-religious crisis in Jos since early 2000 to date, and the 1993, 2007 and 2011 post-election crises that spread across the country, most especially the northern parts of Nigeria.
Durotoye (2000) asserts that the Nigerian state is being challenged from ‘above’ and ‘below’ by ethnic, religious and regional groups, and by the state elite itself. He listed youth militancy, religious uprising, labour unrest, ethnic jingoism, and political antagonism as some of the catalysts of assaults on the state. The most recent of them all is the Boko Haram terrorism, which, through ransom kidnapping, politically motivated killings, armed robbery, and other acts of criminality, generated widespread anxiety in the country (Okoli and Iortyer 2014:43). Okpoya, Ugwu and Eme (2012, cited in Durotoye 2015:1251) classified four major manifestations of insecurity in Nigeria as ethno-religious conflict, politically-based violence, economic-based violence and organised violent groups. These forms of violence have variously created humanitarian problems and have threatened Nigeria’s desire towards achieving sustainable political and economic development.
